On 12 September 2025, the EU extended individual sanctions against those involved in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine for another six months, although initially it had planned to extend them for a year.
This decision was a compromise with Hungary and Slovakia, which had demanded the removal of six Russian businessmen from the sanctions list. Otherwise, the two countries might not have supported the extension of the measures, which were set to expire on 15 September.
“These are restrictive measures concerning actions that undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine. Hungary and Slovakia insist on lifting these measures with respect to six individuals, Russian businessmen,” an EU diplomat told European Pravda.
In the end, the demands of Hungary and Slovakia were not supported: all six Russians remained under sanctions.
At the same time, based on a ruling of the EU General Court, Russian businessman Pavel Ezubov was removed from the list. He is a cousin of Oleg Deripaska — a sanctioned businessman and owner of the industrial conglomerate Russian Machines, which includes the Military Industrial Company, one of the largest suppliers of weapons and military equipment for the Russian armed forces. Oleg Deripaska had transferred part of his assets to Ezubov, including real estate in France and a hotel in Austria. However, during the court proceedings it was noted that Ezubov had received some of the assets from Deripaska before 2014, while not holding a controlling stake. In addition, some of the assets had since been sold.
Who did Hungary and Slovakia want to remove from the sanctions list?
Mikhail Fridman. Sanctioned Russian oligarch, citizen of Russia and Israel. Co-founder of the Alfa Group, through which he was linked to the military-industrial complex (MIC): its subsidiary AlfaStrakhovanie insured, among other things, the property of the Russian Kalashnikov holding and vehicles of military units. In 2024, he sold his stake in Alfa Group and no longer has official ties to it. In 2023, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) indicted him, stating that he had used his business resources to massively distribute rations, clothing, and other products under the Russian Army trademark to Russian troops at the front.
Pyotr Aven. Sanctioned Russian oligarch, citizen of Russia and Latvia. Like Fridman, he is a co-founder of Alfa Group, through which he was linked to the MIC, and sold his stake in 2024.
Alisher Usmanov. Sanctioned Russian oligarch of Uzbek origin. Founder and owner of 49% of USM Holdings — a conglomerate of metallurgy, mining, telecommunications, and technology companies. His link to the MIC is primarily through USM enterprises such as Metalloinvest and its subsidiary OEMK named after A.A. Ugarov, which supplied billets to the Izhevsk Mechanical Plant producing firearms and supplying the Kalashnikov concern. USM’s telecom company Megafon provided communications for dozens of units of Russia’s Ministry of Defence, Rosgvardia, and defence enterprises. A murky situation surrounds Ural Steel, which supplied rolled metal sheets to Uralvagonzavod, a producer of tanks and other armoured vehicles. Officially, Usmanov sold it in 2022, but investigators claim offshore entities, already liquidated at the time, were involved in the deal on both sides. Founders are currently concealed, and profits may still be funnelled to Usmanov discreetly. In 2022, the SBU reported finding Usmanov’s hidden warehouses with iron ore destined for Russia’s metallurgical industry and MIC to support Russian occupation forces.
Albert Avdolyan. Sanctioned Russian businessman known for his role in Russia’s energy sector. Owns coal and gas companies in the Far East and Siberia. His main assets include A-Property, the Elga coal complex, the New Home charitable foundation, and the Yakut Fuel and Energy Company. His ties to the MIC run through his long-time associate Sergey Chemezov, CEO of Rostec. Chemezov repeatedly supported Avdolyan’s business projects, including securing frequencies for the launch of his first major project — the telecom operator Yota. Funds for purchasing the Yakut Fuel and Energy Company came from Novikombank, Rostec’s bank. After the full-scale invasion, Rostec withdrew from joint projects with Avdolyan due to Western sanctions.
Dmitry Mazepin. Sanctioned Belarusian-Russian oligarch, founder of Uralkhim. His link to the MIC is through Uralkhim — a civilian fertilizer producer that also supplied chemical compounds to military plants. Its branches supplied nitric and sulfuric acids to the Sverdlov Plant for explosive production. Mazepin resigned as Uralkhim chairman and sold a controlling stake but still holds 48%. In 2023, Putin awarded him the Order of Alexander Nevsky “for labour achievements and long-term conscientious work.”
Musa Bazhaev. Russian businessman of Chechen origin, one of the wealthiest oligarchs in Russia. He heads the Alliance group of companies operating in oil, construction, textiles, finance, and media. According to the EU, Bazhaev is a “leading businessman whose activities provide significant revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.” He is also co-owner of Russian Platinum. The main clients of the Alliance Group include companies in Russia’s gas, oil, and telecommunications sectors, which are crucial to the economy and defence capabilities of the Russian Federation.
