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Can US efforts alone limit Western microelectronics in Russian missiles? Senate debate

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Intel, AMD, Analog Devices, and Texas Instruments testified at a meeting of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) of the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. At the meeting, a report was released in which the authors analysed 25,000 components of Russian weapons seized from the battlefield in Ukraine. And more than 70% of those components were made by American companies. Chips can be found in Russian missiles and even in North Korea's military systems.
According to the subcommittee's chairman, Senator Richard Blumenthal, these companies have failed to properly monitor and audit their distributors. He noted: "These electronics are being transferred through shadowy start-ups and shell companies in countries such as Armenia, Turkey, and Kazakhstan. In six visits to Ukraine, I have met people who have lost limbs to missiles like the Kh-101. And I heard one request from President Zelenskyy and his military leaders — from every soldier and citizen of Ukraine — to stop the flow of American technology that helps the Russians maim and kill Ukrainians."
Blumenthal was opposed by Senator Ron Johnson. In particular, he noted that the problem of Russia's access to American microelectronics is broader than a purely American context, as microchip trade takes place in a globalised economy. According to him, the key supply chain is not located in the United States, but in third countries, which legally import American microchips to their countries and then resell them to Russia. 
Senator Johnson emphasised that sanctions against Russia are imperfect, as it has been able to successfully circumvent oil restrictions, and the Russian economy has demonstrated resilience to Western sanctions. He said: "I fully support sanctions designed to deter and punish Russian aggression, but we have to be honest and make a clear assessment of whether our sanctions are achieving their goals and whether sanctions are doing more harm to us and our allies." Johnson is convinced that trying to blame microelectronics manufacturers means ignoring this important aspect of the problem.
Representatives of Intel, AMD, Analog Devices, and Texas Instruments, who took part in the hearing, emphasised that Russian weapons contain basic microchips that are not subject to export restrictions and were produced before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. And the manufacturers themselves strictly comply with sanctions and limit the supply of even those components that are not critical under US law.
At the same time, Subcommittee Chairman Blumenthal presented evidence that microelectronics manufacturers are not doing enough to limit Russia's access to microchips. For example, after Intel's presentation, he noted that the company does not conduct regular audits and reviews of its export control programmes. Blumenthal called on US companies to monitor their microchip supply chains more closely, as well as to audit sales through other countries such as Turkey, Kazakhstan and Georgia. And not only to respond to requests to trace a particular microchip, but also to send delegations to Ukraine to examine the evidence themselves.
"As practice shows, and this hearing in particular, compliance at the level of manufacturers alone can't solve the problem of supplying Western microelectronics to Russia. Indeed, a large number of such components do not come from the countries of the pro-Ukrainian coalition, but from ‘neutral’ or more pro-Russian states that have neither restrictions on imports to Russia nor special responsibility for facilitating sanctions evasion. There is an indisputable fact, confirmed by more than two years of full-scale invasion, that Western microelectronics manufacturers do not control their products outside their countries. However, there is also another fact: even in the current environment, suppliers could do more to analyse, verify and monitor the movement of their products abroad. This was also clearly demonstrated during the Senate hearing. Effective sanctions policy — and especially export controls — requires greater determination on the part of governments. We need coercion, not recommendations," said Victoria Vyshnivska, senior researcher at NAKO.