The resignation of Yuliia Svyrydenko’s government on 14 July 2026 triggered intense political bargaining over positions in the new Cabinet. Ahead of the Servant of the People parliamentary faction meeting on 15 July, it became clear that the Ministry of Defence had also come under scrutiny, with Mykhailo Fedorov’s position increasingly uncertain.
However, before making a decision about the head of the defence ministry of a country at war to satisfy political interests, it is worth addressing several fundamental questions. These provide the framework for evaluating both the minister’s performance and the current state of Ukraine’s security and defence sector.
What Is the Minister Responsible For?
Following last year’s government restructuring, the Ministry of Defence’s mandate expanded to encompass around 260 areas of responsibility, and this list is not exhaustive. In practice, this reflected the integration of the former Ministry for Strategic Industries into the Ministry of Defence, transferring full responsibility for the development of Ukraine’s defence industrial base to the ministry. Consequently, the Minister is responsible for implementing the ministry’s mandate as a whole while also serving as its public representative.
Were There Problems at the Ministry Under Previous Ministers?
Yes—more than enough.
Published shortly before Fedorov’s appointment, the Green Book outlined the key strategic challenges facing Ukraine under the country’s new security environment. These challenges were presented as policy dilemmas that cannot be resolved in ways that satisfy all stakeholders simultaneously. Instead, they require difficult choices and clear prioritization based on available resources. It is unrealistic to expect such a complex set of structural problems to be resolved within a six-month tenure.
The experience of previous defence ministers also demonstrates that leadership changes after only six months almost always have negative consequences for the institution. Reforms rarely progress beyond the planning stage before priorities shift again and teams are forced to adapt to new leadership. Similar examples have already occurred: Andrii Zahorodniuk and Denys Shmyhal both served as Minister of Defence for less than a year, and many of the reforms they initiated either lost momentum or were left to their successors.
An Inherited Personnel Crisis
Throughout 2022, Ukraine’s Defence Forces were reinforced primarily by volunteers. As the war became protracted, however, the government increasingly relied on compulsory mobilization, generating growing public discontent.
This contributed to rising numbers of draft evasion, unauthorized abandonment of military units (AWOL), and desertion.
The absence of realistic demobilization mechanisms further aggravated the situation. In practice, service members can only leave the military due to medical reasons, family circumstances, or upon reaching the statutory retirement age of 60–65.
Statistics published by the Office of the Prosecutor General illustrate the scale of the problem. Between January 2022 and September 2025, authorities registered 235,646 criminal proceedings related to unauthorized absence and 53,954 cases of desertion. Data for 2026 remain unavailable, as the Prosecutor General’s Office restricted public access to such statistics in December 2025 under martial law.
Several attempts were made to address the issue. In August and November 2024, and again between May and August 2025, Parliament introduced legal mechanisms exempting service members from liability if they voluntarily returned to military service. However, these temporary “windows of opportunity” failed to solve the broader problem of personnel shortages.
Five Clear Successes of Mykhailo Fedorov
Disabling Russian Starlink Terminals and Introducing a Ukrainian “Whitelist”
Beginning in December 2025, evidence emerged that Russian forces were using Starlink terminals to control strike drones. This gave them significant battlefield advantages, including resistance to electronic warfare, enhanced manoeuvrability at very low altitudes, and real-time command and control.
Thanks to direct contacts between Fedorov and Elon Musk, Ukraine succeeded in introducing the principle of disabling unverified terminals operating within Ukrainian territory. At the same time, Resolution No. 115 established a verification procedure for civilian users through Administrative Service Centres (CNAPs).
A Data-Driven Approach to Defence Procurement
Procurement decisions for weapons and military equipment are no longer based primarily on officials’ subjective assessments but increasingly rely on data analysis.
The Ministry conducted a comprehensive audit of both its own operations and frontline brigades using 160 evaluation criteria. According to Ukraine’s National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP), procurement of drones and electronic warfare systems had previously suffered from three systemic risks: excessive discretion by the General Staff, weak alignment with frontline needs, and the lack of genuine competition because procurement decisions focused on product names rather than technical performance.
Since 10 March 2026, the Ministry has transitioned to an automated procurement model. For soldiers on the front line, this means procurement requests are generated according to the actual operational requirements of brigades, allowing units to receive drones best suited to their missions.
Diversifying Procurement Through the Defence Procurement Agency
Following a series of scandals, the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) no longer awards contracts for drones, unmanned ground systems, and ammunition to a single supplier. Instead, procurement is distributed according to a dedicated formula:
- Price threshold: bids exceeding the lowest market offer by more than 30% are automatically excluded.
- Reducing intermediaries: where several distributors represent the same manufacturer, the contract goes to the bidder offering the lowest price.
- Production capacity audits: manufacturers’ actual production capabilities are verified before contracts are signed.
Anti-Corruption Measures
The Ministry of Defence manages the country’s largest public procurement budget.
After receiving intelligence from law enforcement agencies regarding possible corruption networks in January 2026, the Ministry conducted large-scale polygraph examinations of officials. Those who either refused testing or failed the examinations were dismissed.
The Ministry also uncovered and dismantled a scheme involving the leakage of confidential procurement information from the Defence Procurement Agency to defence manufacturers.
Competitive Procurement Instead of Manual Decision-Making
This summer, the Ministry launched competitive tenders for weapons procurement—including middle-range and deep-strike drones—without discriminatory requirements regarding range or payload.
Greater competition has already produced measurable results. During procurement of 155 mm artillery shells in May 2026, the Ministry achieved savings exceeding 16%, contributing to its broader objective of reducing procurement costs by up to 20%.
Long-Overdue Decisions
Several important—though imperfect—reforms that had been postponed for years were finally adopted during Fedorov’s tenure.
Exporting Ukrainian Weapons
The issue had been discussed since early 2025 but was only formally regulated in July 2026.
The new framework introduced the principle of “silent consent,” reduced the routine role of the Interagency Commission under the National Security and Defence Council, and established an exhaustive list of legal grounds for denying export permits.
The reform is expected to generate additional state revenue through administrative fees on export transactions while preserving priority supplies for Ukraine’s Armed Forces. Although the system still contains several risks, it at least provides a publicly available framework governing future defence exports.
Reforming Military Compensation
The Ministry introduced several new categories of military contracts lasting 6, 10, 14, and 24 months.
The new compensation model includes:
- assault infantry contracts averaging UAH 300,000, with payments reaching UAH 460,000;
- combat contracts ranging from UAH 30,000 to UAH 120,000;
- basic contracts ranging from UAH 30,000 to UAH 70,000.
The reform aims to make military service more attractive, including increasing the share of foreign personnel in assault units to between 30% and 50%.
For service members stationed away from the front line, the most significant innovation is a monthly bonus of UAH 10,000, effectively raising the guaranteed minimum level of compensation for the first time since 2022.
Critics argue that these measures lack sustainable funding unless the basic salary is increased. However, over the past four years, Parliament has consistently amended the state budget between August and October to allocate additional funding for military salaries.
Reforming State Quality Assurance
The introduction of a unified digital risk matrix, the separation of advisory, inspection, and final approval functions, and the gradual replacement of permanent military representative offices inherited from the Soviet system represent important institutional reforms.
However, successful implementation will require both additional time and a sufficient number of qualified officers within the State Quality Assurance system.
Conclusion
So, how effective has Mykhailo Fedorov been as Minister of Defence?
Given the necessary wartime secrecy surrounding much of the Ministry’s work, the public cannot see the full picture. Nevertheless, the information that is publicly available already points to a clear conclusion: the Ministry has made technology a strategic priority while finally taking meaningful steps to dismantle corruption schemes in defence procurement, fundamentally changing the way Ukraine equips its armed forces.
Over the course of its work, NAKO has engaged with seven Ministers of Defence—from Stepan Poltorak to Mykhailo Fedorov. That experience suggests one simple but critically important lesson: it is impossible to fairly assess the performance of a minister leading such a complex institution before they have served at least one year in office.
This is not a matter of political preference but of sound governance. Constant leadership changes and the recurring practice of replacing defence ministers every six months do not accelerate reform. On the contrary, they disrupt institutional continuity, paralyze the ministry’s work, and create unnecessary risks for Ukraine’s Armed Forces while the country remains engaged in active combat operations.
Photo: Mykhailo Fedorov’s social media