On 1 May 2026, the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO) held a roundtable discussion titled “Closing loopholes in sanctions: how to weaken Russia’s military-industrial complex, energy sector, and shadow fleet.” Participants discussed the remaining gaps in sanctions policy against Russia, ways to make restrictions more effective, and the tools that can strengthen their impact.
The speakers included:
- Taras Boietskyi, Head of the Sanctions Policy Coordination Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine;
- Viktoriia Vyshnivska, Senior Researcher at NAKO;
- Pavlo Shkurenko, Sanctions Policy Expert, KSE Institute;
- Oleksandr Moiseienko, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of United24 Media, investigative journalist;
- Mykhailo Babiichuk, General Manager for Security and Resilience, DiXi Group;
- Stanislav Brus, representative of the B4Ukraine coalition;
- Ihor Krupka, Head of Analytical Department, ANTAC Network;
- Oleh Savitskyi, Strategic Advisor, Razom We Stand.
The EU’s 20th sanctions package against Russia is one of the most comprehensive to date, said Taras Boietskyi, Head of the Sanctions Policy Coordination Department at Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Despite political challenges around its adoption, the EU managed to cover a wide range of sectors. The package targets 58 arms manufacturers, including drone producers, as well as 16 companies from third countries that helped Russia access Western technologies. Ukraine is already working on mirroring EU sanctions, Boietskyi noted.
“Notably, the European Union has already imposed sanctions on 632 vessels of the so-called shadow fleet. These measures target tankers that circumvent the oil price cap mechanism, transport military equipment for Russia, or carry stolen Ukrainian grain. We will continue to advocate for sanctions to cover not only Ukraine’s stolen resources, such as grain, but also other assets that the Russian Federation is looting from temporarily occupied territories,” said Taras Boietskyi.
Russia’s shadow fleet is estimated at 800 to 1,400 tankers — around 20% of the global tanker fleet, said Ihor Krupka, Head of Analytical Department at ANTAC. Around 200–400 vessels remain outside sanctions. “Russia is trying to bypass sanctions by constantly changing flags, vessel registration, crews, and names. That is why continuous monitoring and tracking of these tankers is necessary,” he explained.
The uneven sanctions coverage of the Russian state corporation Rostec was presented by Viktoriia Vyshnivska, Senior Researcher at NAKO. Rostec controls around 492 enterprises that produce roughly half of Russia’s weapons and military equipment. However, sanctions against its subsidiaries vary significantly across jurisdictions: the UK has sanctioned about 5%, the EU 22%, and the US 45%, including a significant share through export controls. “Export control is important because sanctions and export controls have different consequences. Export control restricts the supply of specific categories of goods to these enterprises,” Vyshnivska said.
Sanctions on the military-industrial complex do not produce immediate results, but gradually increase the cost of war for Russia, said Pavlo Shkurenko of KSE Institute. He highlighted two key trends. First, Russia’s access to Western high-tech components has become more limited and significantly more expensive, pushing it to rely more on Chinese alternatives. Second, as costs rise, military enterprises increasingly compete with the civilian sector for scarce technologies, slowing Russia’s broader economic and technological development.
According to Oleksandr Moiseienko of United24 Media, citing internal Russian documents, sanctions are increasing the cost of logistics and reducing industrial efficiency. The use of third-country supply routes raises costs by at least 20%, while payment systems have become more complicated due to the risk of secondary sanctions. In some sectors, exports have fallen by 2–2.5 times, and production capacity has dropped to 40–50%. “In many sectors, we are seeing a gradual degradation of industry,” he said.
A major gap in energy-related sanctions remains Russia’s nuclear sector, said Mykhailo Babiichuk of DiXi Group. “Rosatom includes companies producing dual-use goods and working with software and other areas integrated into the economies and energy systems of European countries. Through this, there is also political influence on these states,” he noted.
Russia is attempting to build LNG tankers domestically but lacks key capabilities, said Oleh Savitskyi of Razom We Stand. One of the critical missing elements is French cryogenic membrane technology used in LNG production. “It is important to prevent Russia from accessing this technology in order to cut it off from the global liquefied natural gas market,” he explained.
The role of civil society in strengthening sanctions was highlighted by Stanislav Brus of the B4Ukraine coalition. He stressed that sanctions are a legal tool, but they depend on political will shaped by public pressure and advocacy. B4Ukraine works through campaigns, corporate pressure, and public accountability to push governments and companies to act. “Sanctions emerge when there is political will. And this will is shaped by public discourse and organised civil society pressure. We work directly to help create it,” Brus said.